PRE- EMPTIVE FORENSIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

While corporate failures, such as Enron, WorldCom, Tyco International Ltd, Peregrine Systems, iVillage, Adelphia Communications Corp, Hollinger International , Barings Bank and the recent Societe Generale bank have focused attention on issues of accounting and financial indiscretion, there is nothing inherently new in the reasons behind these corporate collapses. Neither is there anything original in the media's hurry to name a scapegoat. For example, at “Barings Futures Singapore (BFS)'s [the] management’s structure through 1995 enabled Leeson to operate without supervision from London headquarters. Leeson was not only the floor manager for Barings' trading division on the Singapore International Monetary Exchange, he was also the head of settlement operations. Leeson was responsible for ensuring that accurate accounting information was reported to the unit. Normally the head of settlement operations and floor manager would have been held by two different employees. In other words Leeson reported to himself. This absence of checks and balances short-circuited normal accounting and auditing safeguards. After the collapse, several observers, including Leeson himself, placed much of the blame on the bank's own deficient internal auditing and risk management practices. People at the London end of Barings were all [know- it- all’s] that nobody dared ask a stupid question in case they looked silly in front of everyone else” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barings_Bank).
SO WHO GAVE LEESON ALL THIS AUTONOMY? WAS IT NOT TOP EXECUTIVES??

If …… “Most important, the corrective actions taken to date [cannot] be sufficient to reduce the frequency and magnitude of corporate bankruptcies. …Without changes in the policy-related conditions that contribute to corporate failure, improved accounting and auditing procedures [will] accelerate bankruptcies with little effect on their frequency or magnitude. Almost all of the public and press attention, however, has focused on reducing the accounting violations, not on those policies that contribute to business failure. The major lesson from the collapse of Enron and other large corporations is that the rules of corporate governance do not adequately protect the interests of the general shareholders against the increasingly divergent interests of corporate managers (www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb108/hb108-22.pdf).

It is argued that a combination of legislation, regulation, effective risk management and appropriate sanctions are needed, if such unethical behaviour, and resulting corporate failure, is to be prevented in future. However, what is required is an astute, independent, assessment of these financial collapse debacles. This may establish that failures within these companies' corporate cultures and management systems allow, if not encourage, unethical behaviour by key individuals. COULD IT BE THAT THE CONTINUATION OF THE OLD BOYS CLUB may be the fundamental reason for the blatant disregard and perception of invincibility/groupthink mentality of same. COULD IT BE THAT ONCE AN EMPLOYEE IS INCREASING THE PROFITS AND BOTTOM LINE OF AN ORGANIZATION HE/SHE IS SHELTERED BY TOP EXECUTIVES, WHO MAY TURN A BLIND EYE TO UNETHICAL PRACTICES?

Dr. Rookmin Maharaj’s research on:
Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors:
Study of the Importance of the Role of the Formal & Informal Systems

Investigates corporate governance issues from a behavioural viewpoint. It makes a distinction between strict adherence to formal rules and regulations: CEO/Chair separation, independence of board members and board size and informal characteristics of board members: knowledge, values, and groupthink.
There are three main conclusions from her research and corporate experience:
1. Clearly proves that formal rules and regulations are inadequate; they have little effect upon decision making by board members. Informal characteristics must be considered in unison with the formal system when nominating board members, management and employees in order to restore shareholder confidence and to rebuild trust in corporate governance.
2. Similar values and groupthink can contribute positively to corporate decision making. However, there is a high possibility for groupthink and values to become redundant, masking board members’ and managements’ knowledge thus affecting their decision making process.
3. Skills matrices that include questions related to values, knowledge and groupthink should be considered by corporations to ensure the nomination of well-rounded members, management and employees.
Changes to board process, and board decision making, are seminal in preventing future Enron and WorldCom fiascoes. It is only by changing the behaviours of the board of directors, through adopting skills matrices, that sweeping changes can occur. In the past boards have asked: who are our board members? However, the most important question a board can ask today is: how can the skills and knowledge of our board members be used in service of the strategic direction of the corporation? This can be achieved by recruiting new board members, management and employees who fill the needs of an organization, in contrast to nominating ‘friends’ and continuing the tradition of the old boys club.

Dr. Maharaj argues that, and has tangible evidence, that what should be done is a forensic audit on 'the people that we hire' and 'employees, managers, board members' should also conduct an audit on their potential employers. What is your opinion?

Does your opinion change with this update?

According to alleged rogue trader Jerome Kerviel, " his bosses turned a blind eye to his massive, questionable trades as long as he made money for the bank"(EMMA VANDORE, http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5h4ncvzDOrXAnqyB9avT4zvg1iJTQD8UG7MBG0Societe Generale Board Meets).